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Towards a consumerist critique of capitalism: A 
socialist defence of consumer culture* 
Matthias Zick Varul 
abstract 
Anti-capitalism and anti-consumerism seem to be part of the same package and, for 
some, anti-consumerism has become the core element of anti-capitalist activism. In this 
paper I will argue that such an approach inadvertently allies itself with reactionary anti-
capitalisms as it fails to understand the contribution of consumer culture to the 
proliferation of values of freedom and personal development that underpin the Marxian 
notion of communism. Therefore, I will suggest, there is a case for a socialist defence of 
consumer culture. I will further argue that the capitalist relations of production and the 
growing inequalities resulting from them limit the liberty which consumerism inspires, 
while capitalist employers seek to expropriate the creative and inter-connected 
individuality fostered in the sphere of consumption. Hence, I will suggest, there is a case 
for a consumerist critique of capitalism. Finally I will propose that consumerism also 
contributes to a development of the general intellect as capacity to imagine alternative 
futures and leaderless organization that make a realization of that critique less unlikely. 
Introduction 
To suggest a ‘consumerist critique of capitalism’ sounds quite oxymoronic – and 
even more so a ‘socialist defence of consumer culture’. Consumerism is widely 
seen as the cultural expression of developed capitalism, and Marxist analyses 
from the 1970s onwards have tried to show how the development of an absorbent 
market for consumer goods was driven by the needs of accumulation and 
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valorization in late capitalism (e.g. Mandel, 1975). Following Wolfgang Fritz 
Haug’s (1986) Critique of commodity aesthetics one could say that, from the point 
of view of capital, there emerged a very real need for false needs. According to 
Marshall Berman’s reading of Marx, we have to acknowledge the unprecedented 
freedom afforded by bourgeois capitalism, even though ‘the freedom Marx has 
given with one hand he seems to be taking back with the other: everywhere he 
looks, everyone seems to be in chains’ (Berman, 1999: 44). Yet, with Berman, I 
will argue that from a dialectical point of view, capitalist consumer culture may 
still hold the key to unlocking the potential for human development that is both 
built up and held back by capitalism. Referring to a vague prediction in the last 
pages of Capital, Berman notes that after the initial period of capitalism that 
follows a rigid rationality of accumulation, in a  
‘consumer’ period the capitalist becomes like other men: he regards himself as a 
free agent, able to step back from his role as producer and accumulator, even to 
give it up entirely for the sake of pleasure or happiness, for the first time he sees 
his life as an open book, as something to be shaped according to his choice. 
(Berman, 1999: 51) 
In this perspective, socialism is to be built on the individualistic hedonism of 
consumer culture, making it available in the same measure for all. The most 
promising approach towards consumer culture here would be what Kate Soper 
(2007) calls ‘alternative hedonism’ – developing responsible pleasure-seeking out 
of and beyond the hedonism of the capitalist market society – rather than ‘anti-
consumerism’ as an outright rejection of individual pleasure-seeking understood 
as a capitalism-induced moral wrong. I would go so far as to charge the brand of 
anti-capitalism that expresses itself mainly or solely as anti-consumerism with 
what Marx and Engels (1848/2004) term in the Communist manifesto ‘reactionary 
socialism’ – an anti-capitalism that seeks salvation in the rejection of technology 
and consumption, and whose utopia tends to be a world of de-technologized 
frugal communities. It rejects the progress in human development available 
from a capitalist society and tries to re-establish older forms of ‘authentic’ 
community; localized solidarities that imply parochialism and paternalism, even 
if they are in most cases not the intended outcome. 
Against this stands Marx’s belief that any alternative to capitalism, desirable from 
a standpoint of human development, cannot turn back on the progress made in 
individual autonomy and liberty. He also believed that this progress is owed to 
the dismantling of traditional feudal, paternalistic and communal relations 
effected, largely, by the capitalist economy. Marx was convinced that alienation in 
these terms – the destruction of the highly personal ties of the pre-capitalist 
world – was above all liberation. Gerald Cohen (1974) speaks of an end to 
‘engulfment’. I will argue that the practice of consumerism has entrenched ideas 
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of individual liberty and self- development beyond the point Marx could imagine 
as possible within a capitalist society.  
I will further follow Marx as he makes the case that it is not individualism that is 
the problem in a liberal capitalist society, but its inability to fully realize the 
implicit promise of universal freedom. Capitalist accumulation inevitably creates 
not only unknown freedoms, but also unheard-of inequalities. Still following 
Marx to an extent, I will argue that these inequalities are not in themselves the 
problem. The problem is that these inequalities translate into inequalities of 
power (see e.g. Buchanan, 1982: 71; Gould, 1978; Negri; 1991) and thus impact 
on the personal freedom that is the central value in capitalist culture, so that in 
the end the capitalist achievements embodied in consumer culture need to be 
protected from what produced them in the first place: capitalism itself. 
Finally, I will argue that consumerism does not only contribute to a normative 
background that makes a successful critique of capitalism possible without 
recourse to traditional values (communal, nationalistic, religious) – it also fosters 
a development in the ‘general intellect’, facilitating the organization of free 
individuals in ways that do not imply the hierarchical, quasi-military apparatuses 
instrumental in the revolutions of the past (from the Jacobins to the 
Communists).  
Anti-consumerism as desperation of the left 
The initial socialist concern about consumption was not about how it is bad for 
you – it was how there is not enough of it. The original intent of socialist politics 
was to distribute the product of social production equally among those who 
produce it – so everybody, and not just a few, can consume what they need and if 
possible, even more than that. This – although not in a socialist context – is also 
the central point of Daniel Miller’s critique of the critique of consumerism, when 
he points out that: 
We live in a time when most human suffering is the direct result of the lack of 
goods. What most of humanity desperately needs is more consumption, more 
pharmaceuticals, more housing, more transport, more books, more computers. 
(2001: 227-228) 
The point here is not that there is nothing wrong with capitalism – there is quite 
a lot. The point is that what is wrong with capitalism is not an alleged 
psychological and cultural suffering caused by consumption and ‘having’, but the 
exploitation of people and nature in a system that constantly increases 
inequalities of wealth/wellbeing and power. So what I am taking issue with here 
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is anti-consumerism that is concerned about things like ‘happiness’, and 
authenticity. This does not cover tactical political non-consumption (e.g. 
politically-motivated boycotts, anarcho-cycling, veganism, etc.; see Portwood-
Stacer, 2012) or other, less radical forms of political consumption (such as fair 
trade) that attempt to address global inequalities and ecological consequences of 
overproduction by using non-consumption or alternative consumption as a 
means to an end. Rather, it refers to a widespread sense that consumerism just 
isn’t good for you: the general sense of a ‘consumer malaise’ – consumerism as 
denting individual happiness, that supplies followers to the growing lifestyle 
movement of ‘voluntary simplicity’ (Alexander and Ussher, 2012) where an 
individualistic concern for the spiritual aspects of one’s own life takes precedence 
over broader political objectives (e.g. Shaw and Thompson, 2002). 
But how is a concern for the material well-being of all transformed into a concern 
about the spread of consumerism even among the poor? Gould (2003: 343), for 
example, worries that the beneficiaries of fair trade may be turned into 
consumers. My estimate would be that it all began when revolutionary socialism 
started to go wrong – when it became clear that the workers were not going to 
make the revolution that Marx had predicted they would. In his 1916 pamphlet 
on imperialism, Lenin ascribed the failure of the workers of the industrialized 
nations to rise up, in essence, to consumerist bribery funded out of the profits of 
colonialist exploitation: 
Out of such enormous superprofits [...] it is possible to bribe the labour leaders 
and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy. [...] This stratum of worker-
turned-bourgeois or the labour aristocracy, who are quite philistine in their mode 
of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop 
of the Second International, and in our days, the principal social prop [...] of the 
bourgeoisie. (Lenin, 1916) 
The discovery of the ‘affluent worker’ in the 1960s (even though the discoverers 
themselves rejected the idea of an embourgeoisement of the working classes, see 
Goldthorpe et al., 1969: 116ff.) – seemed to put a definitive end to any realistic 
hope for a workers’ uprising. The notion of self-emancipation, so central to 
historical materialism, is quickly given up and replaced by the older idea of a 
vanguard educating the masses (Geras, 1986: 134). Geras gives us two examples:  
The first is Althusser: for whom men are nothing more than the supports/effects 
of their social, political and ideological relations. But if they are nothing more than 
this, how can they possibly destroy and transform these relations? The answer is, 
as it has to be, by the power of a knowledge (Theoretical Practice) brought to them 
from elsewhere. The second is Marcuse: the working class integrated, 
manipulated, indoctrinated, its revolutionary potential contained, submitting to 
exploitation and oppression willingly, and failing to perceive, because unable to 
perceive, where its real interests lie. It is no accident that Marcuse keeps returning 
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to the notion of ‘educational dictatorship’, only to reject it each time as 
unacceptable. (Geras, 1986: 140-141) 
While, initially, educational systems and family structures competed for the part 
of the main ‘ideological state apparatus’, relatively soon a consensus emerged 
that an agglomeration of consumerism, culture industries and media is 
responsible for widespread acquiescence to capitalist injustice, nipping any 
subversive movement in the bud by means of cooptation (for a critique of this 
notion see Frank, 1998; Heath and Potter, 2005). A new society, in this view, can 
only be formed out of people who have been freed from the stranglehold of 
consumerism – and hence it can only be built on the success of an anti-
consumerist movement. In short: people need to be educated to be immune to 
the lure of the world of commodities. Anti-capitalism-as-anti-consumerism 
reneges on the idea of self-emancipation. Anti-consumerism – although it hardly 
ever describes itself in those terms – is a vanguard movement of an enlightened 
few trying to wean the intoxicated masses off their addiction to consumption (e.g. 
Portwood-Stacer, 2012: 97). 
Where even this last hope for a successful anti-consumerist pedagogy is given 
up, nothing but desperation ensues – as most poignantly in the dystopian vision 
of Jean Baudrillard (1970), an all-out culture pessimism with a self-referential 
system of commodity signs entangling us into an inescapable web of simulacra 
that deprive us of any access to something deserving the name ‘reality’. For those 
who still have hope, however, it is no longer progress in terms of redistribution 
of wealth, equality of opportunities and democratization of social institutions that 
is the primary objective, but stemming the tide of commercialization and 
commoditization, which are understood as the ultimate weapons in the 
psychological warfare of corporate capitalism. In this view, the alternative is 
consumerism and commoditization on one side and community and culture on 
the other. As Igor Kopytoff puts it: 
In the sense that commoditization homogenizes value, while the essence of 
culture is discrimination, excessive commoditization is anti-cultural – as indeed so 
many have perceived it or sensed it to be. (1986: 73) 
Among the many to perceive it like this are not only critical theorists and radical 
leftists, but also earlier right-wing thinkers from Oswald Spengler to Carl 
Schmitt to Martin Heidegger (see also Bourdieu, 1991). 
Anti-consumerism in the conservative revolution 
Anti-consumerist sentiment is anti-bourgeois – but in an oddly 
bourgeois/aristocratic way. One could say it is part of the self-elevation of the 
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middle classes. The sneering attitude towards aspiring and/or disruptive 
working-class consumerism is openly acted out in the contempt for celebrity 
culture (e.g. Tyler and Bennett, 2010) and latent even in aspects of the fair trade 
discourse (Raisborough and Adams, 2009; Varul, 2011). Contemporary class 
hatred, as Owen Jones points out, has a strong anti-consumerist streak:  
Many […] show their distaste towards working-class people who have embraced 
consumerism, only to spend their money in supposedly tacky and uncivilized ways 
rather than with the discreet elegance of the bourgeoisie. (Jones, 2011: 8) 
This is not an entirely new phenomenon. Consumerism in the working classes 
was a moral concern throughout the 20th century (Cross, 1993), and it was 
particularly articulated by the proponents of cultural pessimism and the 
conservative revolution which provided the intellectual background music for the 
rise of Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. Their concern was mainly its allegedly 
‘anti-cultural’ nature, just like Kopytoff understands it, as homogenization of 
values. In a commodity society where everything can be exchanged for everything 
else, there may be huge quantitative inequalities – but the legitimacy of 
qualitative inequality in terms of traditional hierarchies and religious authority 
crumbles away 1 . Ernst Jünger’s (1932/1981: 20) condemnation of bourgeois 
society also takes aim at consumerism – which he claims to obscure the 
‘wonderful power’ of the unity of ‘domination and service’ because it values ‘all 
too cheap and all too human pleasures’ too highly2. 
Martin Heidegger (2006: 167-178), in deliberately rustic language, paints his 
picture of the abhorred inauthentic flight from being in the world in terms that 
are clearly targeted at the consumerist aspects of big city life: idle talk, curiosity, 
ambiguity which lead to invidious comparison and alienation. What the 
conservative revolutionaries detested was not only the implication of equality and 
disappearance of hierarchy – it was also its inconsequential, antiheroic 
implications. The Catholic/Fascist political theorist Schmitt brings it to the point 
when he dismisses the spiritual precursors (according to Campbell, 1987) of 
modern consumerism, the romantics and their dreams: 
All their pretensions that lay beyond that were merely possibility. […] But the 
enormous possibilities that they had opposed to reality never became reality. The 
romantic solution to this difficulty consists in representing possibility as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Of course they – and Kopytoff – have it wrong on one count: there may be a 
homogenization of value, but not of content and meaning – the qualitative difference 
of things is the very precondition for their commercial exchangeability (as Marx 
points out: quantitatively equal exchange value is expressed – and thus depends on – 
qualitatively unequal use value). 
2  My translation. 
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higher category. In commonplace reality, the romantics could not play the role of 
the ego who creates the world. They preferred the state of eternal becoming and 
possibilities that are never consummated to the confines of concrete reality. This is 
because only one of the numerous possibilities is ever realized. In the moment of 
realization, all of the other infinite possibilities are precluded. A world is destroyed 
for a narrow-minded reality. (Schmitt, 1986/1919: 66) 
What is rejected here is what in a liberal-democratic society, in a consumer 
society, is valued most highly: diversity, opportunity and possibility over fixed 
identities and tradition. The reactionary critique of consumerism and its 
precursors is one of uprooting, estrangement, alienation from folk, from soil, 
from destiny. Hence, as Natan Sznaider argues, 
one could say that nationalism and consumerism are opposite principles. But that 
does not mean that increase in consumption drives out nationalism altogether. 
The opposite may be true: consumerism provides nationalism with something it 
can condemn – often as ‘Americanization’, the battle cry of modern nationalists. 
Project Europe as an anti-nationalistic consumer project has provoked nationalist 
counter-currents in all European countries. (Sznaider, 1998: 46-47; my 
translation) 
It is around the sentiments of anti-globalization, anti-Americanism and anti-
consumerism that surprising and uncanny alliances emerge between the radical 
left and culturally conservative forces3. The nostalgic nature of anti-consumerism 
and the partial convergence of left and right on it justify, I think, an attempt to 
understand it in terms of ‘reactionary socialism’ whose ‘last words are: corporate 
guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture’ (Marx and Engels, 
1848/2004). 
Liberty and alterity 
The fact that consumerist alienation is a theme in reactionary discourses does 
not, of course, mean that it is a mere myth. Already in his Philosophy of money, 
Georg Simmel (1900/1990) makes a very strong case that the monetization and 
commercialization of everyday life (which culminate in consumer culture) are 
alienating in that they create distances, objectifications and depersonalization 
among the denizens of the modern city4. However, I suggest that it is precisely 
this alienated nature of consumer culture that is at the heart of capitalism’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Jo Littler (2009), for example, points out that the Islamist counter-project against 
Coca Cola, Mecca Cola, has become something of an ‘official drink’ at anti-
globalization events. 
4  Both Georg Lukács and Heidegger as protagonists of the critique of reification on the 
Left and the Right (Honneth, 2008) owe much to this defender of commercial 
civilization. 
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human potential to go beyond itself. In a way, this point is not original – Paolo 
Virno contrasts the despair of Heidegger with the optimism of critical 
communist Walter Benjamin: 
For both Heidegger and Benjamin, those who are curious are forever distracted. 
They watch, learn, try out everything, but without paying attention. […] The 
judgment of the two authors diverges. For Heidegger, distraction, which is the 
correlate of curiosity, is the evident proof of a total uprooting and of a total 
unauthenticity [sic]. The distracted are those who pursue possibilities which are 
always different, but equal and interchangeable (opportunists in the prior meaning 
of the word, if you like). On the contrary, Benjamin clearly praises distraction 
itself, distinguishing in it the most effective means for taking in an artificial 
experience, technically constructed. (Virno, 2004: 93) 
Virno refuses to decide between Heidegger and Benjamin here. Heidegger 
dismisses the realm of possibilities (following Schmitt’s lead), while Benjamin 
embraces the pain of uprooting as the price to be paid for the opportunities of 
development and the freedom it yields.  
If we view consumer culture as one in which individuals are assumed to make 
themselves through their purchases, then this is its central cultural implication: 
it is built on the celebration of individual choices between (commoditized) ways 
of being, becoming and belonging. Monetary mediation suggests the universal 
exchangeability of choices, the seeming reversibility of all decisions, and 
therefore the possibility to keep re-inventing oneself. Following pioneering 
consumer icons such as David Bowie and Madonna, one can complement or 
eradicate former selves by re-fashioning oneself with the help of new sartorial, 
musical, spiritual, ethical etc. stylizations. No chosen identity is ever final (and all 
identities are assumed to be chosen – even if they are not).  
If, with Mary Douglas (1994: 136), we define cultures as standing ‘on forking 
paths of decision trees’ where having ‘embarked on one path’ makes it ‘difficult 
to get back to the choice that would have led another way’ – then consumer 
culture could be described as arrested on that forking where we decided that 
there will be no more forking, that there will be universal reversibility of choice 
(Varul, 2008). Although there is, of course, no real reversibility to be had – this is 
precisely what consumer culture aspires to. Not so much to undo what is done as 
to gain the possibility of infinite expression (an infinity whose impossibility drove 
the original romantics mad). This is one of the reasons why we find death so 
abhorrent and cannot understand the very real desire of members of heroic 
cultures to give their lives in battle or sacrifice, and why it is so difficult to fully 
understand the conclusion of Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim (1935/1900). 
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This romantic occasionalism, rooted in the structural romanticism of money 
(Varul, 2009), is, I suggest, a major contributing factor to the 21st-century victory 
of what Émile Durkheim, writing at the end of the 19th century, called the Cult of 
the Individual – a unifying quasi-religious consensus that the individual person 
is sacred, while attacks on personal freedom and dignity come to be experienced 
as a desecration – which indicates that the human being is both god and believer 
in this. 
Whoever infringes on a man’s life, a man’s freedom, a man’s honour, inspires in 
us a sense of horror which is, in every respect, parallel to that which a believer 
feels when seeing his idol desecrated. Such a morality is therefore not simply a 
matter of healthy discipline or wise economy of existence. It is a religion in which 
Man is at once believer and God. (Durkheim, 1898: 8)5 
While sometimes portrayed as opposites – for example by Leslie Sklair (2011), 
who advocates a socialist globalization driven by a ‘value system’ of ‘human 
rights and responsibilities’ as an alternative to the ‘value system’ of capitalist 
globalization revolving ‘around the culture-ideology of consumerism’ – I think it 
can plausibly be argued, with the quasi-religious sentiment expressed by 
Durkheim being institutionalized in the dogma of human rights, that 
consumerism is its everyday version, its folk-religious practice. Consumerism as 
a culture contains the imperative of self-expression, self-development, i.e. 
incorporates as an aspiration what Marx predicted that communism would 
achieve. This has been expressed most enthusiastically by Berman when he says 
that a major 
bourgeois achievement has been to liberate the human capacity and drive for 
development: for permanent change, for perpetual upheaval and renewal in every 
mode of personal and social life. … In order for people, whatever their class, to 
survive in modern society, their personality must take on the fluid and open form 
of this society. Modern men and women must learn to yearn for change, not 
merely to be open to changes in their personal and social lives, but positively to 
demand them, actively seek them out and carry them through. They must learn 
not to long nostalgically for the ‘fixed, fast-frozen relationships’ of the real or 
fantasized past. (Berman, 1999: 94-95) 
True, this human capacity – lived out and reproduced in the sphere of 
consumption – is often enough recaptured and/or co-opted into the new 
workplace. Subjectivity has become a productive resource and is exploited as 
such – from the classic case of flight attendants analysed by Hochschild (1983) to 
the way that ‘creatives’ are roped into the production of aesthetic use and 
exchange values (e.g. Hesmondalgh and Baker, 2010). The shift from personnel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  My translation. 
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management and industrial relations to ‘human resources management’ from 
the 1980s onwards (e.g. Guest, 1990) constituted a widening of the definition of 
what constitutes labour power reflected in new appraisal systems (e.g. Townley, 
1989), which as instruments of performance assessment give the lie to claims 
that such ‘affective’ labour is beyond measure6. What is measured (and thereby 
expropriated) just encompasses so much more these days.  
Virno (2004) notes how we now sell off to employers our very ability to have a 
conversation as a central element of labour power, which means that we give up 
to them what makes us human. Thus the sphere of capitalist production is 
alienating in a very different sense from the sphere of consumption: the latter 
estranges us in that it uproots immediate relations to others and to nature, in 
that now money transactions mediate between us and objects, creating a distance 
that was not there before. But in the sphere of production, alienation means, in a 
very straightforward way, that we are alienated from what we produce (as we 
don’t own it) and we are alienated from the means of production which, of 
course, we don’t own either; and, if those means of production include our very 
ability to have a conversation, to forge emotional bonds, etc. – then even that no 
longer belongs to us. Here the person is alienated by and subsumed under 
capital. If there is a ‘communism of capital’ (as Virno claims to have found in 
post-Fordism), it is certainly not to be found in the sphere of production. But 
maybe it exists in consumer culture? 
Already when consumption was still much less individualistic than it is now (and 
under the impression of Stalinist and Fascist celebrations of total, militarized 
work, as e.g. in Jünger, 1932/1981), Theodor Adorno, who, in view of his 
condemnation of the culture industry and his nostalgia for high culture, is often 
enlisted in anti-consumerist discourse – defended the sphere of consumption as 
the last bastion of humanity against the machine: 
Only by virtue of opposition to production, as something still not totally 
encompassed by the social order, could human beings introduce a more humane 
one. If the appearance [Schein] of life were ever wholly abrogated, which the 
consumption-sphere itself defends with such bad reasons, then the overgrowth of 
absolute production will triumph. (Adorno, 1951/2005) 
But the sphere of consumption has survived the onslaught of total production so 
far. One reason for this resilience against total subsumption lies in the irony of 
the expropriation of subjectivity in the workplace: in order to be exploited, it must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Of course appraisal systems cannot make objectively correct measurements of 
‘labour value’ – but that has never been possible, not even in the Taylorist factory. As 
long as they are socially accepted one reification of work (e.g. MTM) is as good as the 
other (e.g. current ‘assessment centres’). 
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exist. Human resource managers can select it, they can recruit it, they can reward it 
– but they cannot produce it. Like all labour power, it is also produced and 
reproduced outside the labour contract. The self-expressive creative employees so 
in demand nowadays need to be allowed an existence beyond. There they are to 
construct their authenticity – which then will be expropriated as a productive 
resource.  
Being an efficient employee demands that you are more than an employee. 
Having a life outside work becomes a resource when doing work, not only because 
of the revitalizing function of having a family, a hobby, or doing sports but because 
having these non-work activities develop competences and experiences that might 
help create organizational results. (Pedersen, 2011: 75) 
As much as it craves it, production cannot bring individual subjectivity 
completely under its control, as such subsumption would necessarily destroy it as 
a resource. The sphere of consumption is inevitably unruly and conducive to 
individualism and liberty. This is not to imply a unidirectional causality in which 
individual liberty flows from consumerism. Evidently, as a political project it 
precedes consumer culture7. My claim here is not about historical derivation or 
automatic co-occurrence – it is that everyday practices of consumption contribute 
to the plausibility and self-evidence of such ideas of liberty as self-development 
and self-expression.  
But this is not just about individuality and liberty, it is also about the possibility 
of a sociality that can make do without fixed identity ascriptions. It is about 
cosmopolitanism and alterity. Alterity – a poor translation of Simmel’s 
‘Fremdheit’ (‘strangeness’, ‘foreignness’) – here denotes difference that comes 
without the need to categorize identities (Sennett, 2002). Because in 
cosmopolitan (consumerist) city life we are all strangers in that we are seen to be 
free to construct, reconstruct and reinvent our visualized identities; a 
consumerist city can stomach new strangers, ethnic, religious, aesthetic, sexual, 
etc. difference so much better than any other known form of social life. This is 
more than multiculturalism. We have seen multiculturalism in many forms in 
the past, but it always involved a strong sense of communal belonging and clear 
boundaries between communities (usually along ethno-religious lines). Çağlar 
(1997: 182), arguing from a cosmopolitan perspective against a relapse into such 
communalism, highlights the role of consumer culture in preventing the 
reification of ethnicity, religion and community: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  There are some interesting interconnections – e.g. when Isaiah Berlin (2000) 
identifies romanticism as one source of the modern commitment to individual 
freedom and Campbell (1987) traces modern consumerism back to the same source). 
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A multiculturalism of consumption is a multiculturalism of the market, in which 
consumers are left to define for themselves who they are, away from top-down 
constructions by the state or by fictive ‘communities’. But this implies […] that 
‘culture’ and ‘religion’ must be kept entirely out of the public sphere and that 
citizens should be free to negotiate their own cultural self-definitions through 
exchange and collective consumption. Such a divorce between community and 
culture would need to apply as much to the majority group as to minorities within 
the nation. 
Any alternative to capitalism, if it is not to relapse into a frozen world in which 
everybody has their place, must find a functional equivalent to this alterity-
facilitating function of consumer culture. Currently even the most radically left 
anti-consumerist movements seem to have a tendency to create island 
communities (e.g. Chatzidakis et al., 2012: 502) where, on the one hand, 
alternative forms of sociality can be lived among politically like-minded people, 
but where, on the other hand, a valuation of a sense of place translates into a 
borderline parochial hostility to mobility. Migration within a globalized world is 
viewed with suspicion. Subcommandante Marcos [whom Naomi Klein adopts as 
hero of the anti-consumerist movement, a universal avatar for he ‘is simply us, 
we are the leader we’ve been looking for’ (2002: 3)] speaks of the ‘nightmare of 
migration’, which ‘continues to grow’ (2001: 565). He is rightfully concerned 
about xenophobia and the marginalization of large groups of migrants, but 
anyone who knows a bit about migration will be troubled by the blanket notion of 
a ‘nightmare’. More significantly, he adds the ‘loss of cultural identity’, a genuine 
conservative concern, as equally devastating as hunger and police repression. 
Such an attitude condemns people to their ethnic identities – while 
commoditization offers an exit: 
Anti-modernists often bemoan that ethnic identities today are no longer 
‘authentic’, but are rather superficial, made up of musical tropes and clothing 
styles and exaggerated gestures that aren’t passed down from generation to 
generation, but chosen through the influence of the mass media. But it is precisely 
this commodification that allows people to choose elements from various cultural 
traditions and blend them into a new identity. The same process also makes it 
easier for people to stray from their ‘original’ identities - or in conventional terms, 
to integrate into society. Uncommodified ethnic identities are closed to outsider, 
and raise the costs for straying outside their walls: one either is or isn’t. (Sznaider, 
2000: 307) 
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Nobody knows that better than Subcommandante Marcos himself – hence his 
engagement in the literary market8. 
Like all societies, capitalist societies are built on expectations and mutual 
obligations. But while traditional networks of obligations are first of all 
entangling webs of very specific normative expectations that can be negotiated 
only to a very limited extent, the capitalist economy entails an anonymization and 
generalization of obligation that allows us to be tied up in a very liberal way 
(Varul, 2010: 63). The need to earn money can be understood as generalized debt 
– we owe our existence to society and we need to pay off that debt somehow. 
According to David Graeber (2011) the ideology of indebtedness of the individual 
to society has a long history and is at the heart of the fact of domination. But 
while most other societies have clear ideas about what is owed by whom, in a 
liberal capitalist society we are neither told how to repay our debt (i.e. what to 
work at) nor to whom (i.e. who to work for – except, of course, taxes to 
government). We are not liberated from serfdom as such, but we are no longer 
tied to a particular master and our position of serfdom within society as a whole 
is sweetened by the reverse indebtedness of society to us – in the form of money 
as generalized bills of exchange. In a preview of his Debt: The first 5000 years, 
Graeber explores the moral implications that arise: 
The true ethos of our individualistic society may be found in this equation: We all 
owe an infinite debt to humanity, nature, or the cosmos (however one prefers to 
frame it), but no one else can possibly tell us how to pay it. All systems of 
established authority – religion, morality, politics, economics, the criminal-justice 
system – are revealed to be fraudulent ways of calculating what cannot be 
calculated. Freedom, then, is the ability to decide for ourselves how to pay our 
debts. (Graeber, 2010) 
Of course, Graeber (2011) sees any indebtedness as tied up in recurring relations 
of violence and violation, in which even the balanced reciprocities of the 
neighbourly exchanges of favours, gestures and attention (be it among the British 
people or the Tiv people) become a sinister symptom of repression. But in 
making his case, he cannot avoid emphasizing the universality of such relations 
of mutual indebtedness. Assuming we cannot do away with indebtedness as such 
(i.e. here I disagree with Graeber), the individualistic ethos looks like the best we 
can get. Whether such an individualistic ethos is something worth having at all is 
an open question. The authors of The coming insurrection (The Invisible 
Committee, 2007), for instance, start off by condemning this ethos (which they 
correctly identify as rooted in consumer culture), and in response conjure up a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Marcos has co-authored a novel with crime writer Paco Ignacio Taibo II in which he 
gives himself an image makeover, and features a number of revolution tourists from 
around the world, see Marcos and Taibo II, 2006) 
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world of militant communes – a trajectory denounced by Johannes Thumfart 
(2010) as a leftist remake of antimodernist/protofascist ideologies such as those 
of Carl Schmitt. If, however, the individualistic ethos is to be preserved (which, 
obviously, is what I am arguing for here), change needs to be pursued through 
associationalist (as opposed to communalist) approaches to political action in 
which the individual is emphatically affirmed both in means and ends. And as 
part of this the new possibilities of collective action available in a consumer-
capitalist society need to be recognized, as does the role of consumer choice in a 
socialist society as proposed by Douglas Jay: 
Socialists have been inclined to depreciate the value of free consumers’ choice for 
no better reason than that it has been used as a hypocritical defence of the 
unregulated price scramble. Complacent defenders of laissez-faire have 
emphasized the great importance of allowing the individual to spend his income 
as he likes, and have omitted to notice that he may have no income to spend. And 
socialists have rightly retorted that consumers’ choice is of no more use to a man 
who is penniless than liberty to a man who is starving. Gross inequality, in fact, 
turns consumers’ choice into a mockery. But may not the solution be to mitigate 
inequality rather than to abandon consumers’ choice? (Jay, 1938/1947: 255-256)  
But if capitalism, as Graeber affirms, provides us with a basis for an 
individualistic ethos – why should we be tempted to go beyond capitalism in the 
first place? I will argue that, while the individualistic ethos is the moral 
implication of capitalism, it cannot be realized under capitalism. It is an ideology 
in the sense that it is an appearance created by the practice of capitalism but 
given the lie, as Jay highlighted, by the scandalous inequities emerging from that 
practice.  
Inequality vs. consumerist freedom 
Inequality of wealth, as it entails inequality of power, is a threat to freedom – 
those who don’t have money to spend are excluded from the liberty of consumer 
culture. Liberty is tied to property – and property, by definition, means exclusion. 
The freedom which is a reality for the haves is an empty promise for the have-
nots. But this freedom is not something to be thrown away just because for many 
it is nothing but an ideological appearance. Its realization for all is what Marx 
had in mind when contrasting the division of labour that culminates in 
capitalism and the division of labour in communism. 
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a 
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which 
he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and 
must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in 
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can 
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become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general 
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, herdsman or critic. (Marx, 1845/2000) 
Marx thought about communism primarily in terms of freedom – everything else 
(questions of property, equality, etc.) is a means to this end: the generalization 
and radicalization of the freedom which under capitalism remains a privilege of 
private property (which is why Engels (1847/1999), in The principles of 
communism answers the question of ‘what is communism?’ with ‘communism is 
the doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat’). If there is evil 
in alienation then, as Shlomo Avineri (1969: 116) put it, it is the fact that ‘the 
individual by being denied his private property is denied his existence as 
individual’. 
If the issue is liberty – and if equality is mainly about equal freedoms – then the 
main issue is not immiseration and it is also not alienation. The question is 
whether freedoms are curtailed by unequal distribution of property rights even if 
there is some freedom of movement and expression for most. And property, 
material possession from clothing to newspapers, from Virginia Woolf’s ‘room of 
one’s own’ to computers, does matter for freedom of expression. Selfhood – 
individual or collective, egalitarian or hierarchical, eccentric, traditional, etc. – 
always needs to be constituted in material culture. But only in a capitalist 
consumer society is it to a large extent a matter of choice – hence my concern 
that a blind attack on consumerism will limit freedom and hence my suggestion 
that current consumer culture needs a functional equivalent in a socialist society, 
if that society is to be one of free individuals. 
That negative recognition and negative freedom enshrined in consumerism are 
threatened by the inequalities that the capitalist relations of production, which 
make consumerism possible in the first place, is of course a contentious claim – 
neoliberal promoters of negative freedom in the tradition of Friedrich Hayek 
reject the notion that less money means less freedom (i.e. they disagree 
vehemently with the notion that equality of wealth is a precondition for equality 
of liberty). Huei-Chun Su (2009) brings in John Stuart Mill’s notion of liberty 
against this view. Although Su positions Mill against negative freedom, I think 
she makes it reasonably clear that Mill is far from subscribing to a notion of 
‘positive freedom’ in which more wealth means more capacities and thus more 
freedom. 
In general, more wealth implies more choices to exercise the power of satisfying 
desires, but it does not imply more freedoms in other aspects. If Mill believed that 
more wealth always leads to more freedoms, exchanging liberty for affluence 
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would not be an issue for him. In other words, in Mill’s view, there is no 
proportional correlation between the amount of wealth and the degree of liberty. 
However, for Mill, the idea of liberty cannot be completely cut off from the issue of 
material conditions either. Due to their physical constitutions, human beings need 
a minimum level of means to survive. Therefore, they should not be considered 
entirely free if they face the threat of the deprivation of a minimum level of 
subsistence. (Su, 2009: 391) 
It is easy to see why Mill is right in his rejection of a proportional relation between 
freedom and property. Not only is this due to the law of diminishing returns – 
property is a social thing that can also diminish freedom (a car in a traffic jam, 
for example). However, Su is, I think, mistaken to view Mill’s allowing for some 
‘positive freedom’ as the difference between his concept of freedom and Hayek’s 
position: 
If we think about the liberty of the weaker members in the same community, 
Mill’s principle is actually a protection of their positive liberties. In short, Mill’s 
principle of liberty can be interpreted from the other angle: the purpose of limiting 
some people’s liberty is to protect everyone’s liberty of life and body. (Su, 2009: 
411)  
On the contrary, what Mill does is to spell out the concept of negative freedom in 
a way that makes it easy to see why even negative freedom is curtailed under 
capitalism. The freedom of the less well off is a much smaller one than that of 
those with greater spending power. If such a negative concept of freedom implies 
that its only limit is the obligation of  
not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either 
by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as 
rights (Mill, 1863/1910: 132) 
then, in a society with hugely unequal property rights, the freedom of the poor is 
squeezed into what little space is left by the liberties taken by the rich (Varul, 
2010: 59). Mill provides us with more than an argument for minimum income – 
and he does so by avoiding the trap of positive liberty. With positive liberty you 
have to define what freedom should be freedom-to – and thus introduce 
normativity that impacts on negative freedom (not in that it curtails the freedom 
of the wealthier, but in that it prescribes and proscribes what people can do with 
their freedom). What Mill exposes is that property (as the only quantitatively 
limited positive freedom of an individual) curtails the negative freedom of others 
in that it extends the sphere of one person at the cost of others.  
Therefore there needs to be a quantitative limit. It is easy to see if we go back to 
the car: a car takes up space – space that others then cannot use. It is therefore 
reasonable to limit car use so as to protect the freedom of movement of all. But of 
course these look like relatively insignificant differentials in freedom when 
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compared to the impact that capital accumulation on a larger scale has. Although 
the range of products has changed since Marx wrote Value, Price and Profit 
(1865/1995), the fact remains that a small proportion of the population 
determines a large proportion of demand, and this in effect means that a few 
dictate what kind of work does and does not count as socially necessary – they 
have a disproportional say in the definition of social utility. 
If you consider that two-thirds of the national produce are consumed by one-fifth 
of the population – a member of the House of Commons stated it recently to be 
but one-seventh of the population – you will understand what an immense 
proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries, or 
be exchanged for luxuries, and what an immense amount of the necessaries 
themselves must be wasted upon flunkeys, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we 
know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of 
necessaries. (Marx, 1865/1995)  
Inequality as constantly exacerbated through capital accumulation finds its 
expression in the social opportunity structure, seriously affecting what counts as 
valuable in terms of work (and so also in terms of education) by exerting 
disproportionate influence over what counts as valuable in terms of 
consumption. Capitalism is eating up the liberty that it produces in form of 
consumerism. If we want to protect the human progress culturally instituted in 
the sphere of consumption, we need to think about alternatives to capitalism. 
And this means we have to think in terms of concrete utopias by taking up the 
lost tradition of those Marxist as well as non-Marxist socialists who, in the first 
half of the 20th century, attended to the problem of how to maintain democracy 
and liberty beyond the end of capitalism in the organization of production and 
consumption (e.g. Cole, 1917; Korsch, 1919). But are individualized consumer 
citizens at all capable of inventing a new order, let alone organizing for it? 
Consumerism and general intellect 
As we have seen, the rationale behind the radical turn against consumption is the 
frustration of revolutionary hopes and the idea that consumerism is part of the 
apparatus of oppression (or at least appeasement) that lulls the oppressed and 
creates a false sense of legitimacy by instigating and superficially satisfying false 
needs. I want to suggest a different view – one that reinstates the original 
perspective of Marx: dialectical materialism. Marx does start from an 
acknowledgement of the stifling effect of capitalist production on any creative 
action. In The german ideology, he writes 
the only connection which still links [people] with the productive forces and with 
their own existence – labour – has lost all semblance of self-activity and only 
sustains their life by stunting it. While in the earlier periods self-activity and the 
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production of material life were separated, in that they devolved on different 
persons, and while, on account of the narrowness of the individuals themselves, 
the production of material life was considered as a subordinate mode of self-
activity, they now diverge to such an extent that altogether material life appears as 
the end, and what produces this material life, labour (which is now the only 
possible but, as we see, negative form of self-activity), as the means. (Marx, 
1845/2000) 
The effect of this is alienation – expressing oneself, objectifying and realizing 
oneself in one’s product, through work, is no longer possible. But this is not only 
a deprivation, a cause of unhappiness. It is both a liberation – the separation of 
the person from being entirely defined by their productive role – and also an 
opportunity. 
On the other hand, standing over against these productive forces, we have the 
majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away, and 
who, robbed thus of all real life-content, have become abstract individuals, but who 
are, however, only by this fact put into a position to enter into relation with one 
another as individuals. (Marx 1845/2000) 
In working (meaninglessly) towards the end of a (meaningful) material existence, 
the alienated individual establishes herself as a person who can – in cooperation 
with other persons – take on the way things are organized and change them. 
While for Marx there was not much he could bring up in terms of concretizations 
of such potentials (the individualization afforded in principle by the alienation 
through waged factory work had a strict quantitative limit set by long working 
hours and low pay), today’s material life affords quite a lot of excess individuality. 
Consumer culture is geared towards the construction of individual selfhood, the 
free construction of subjectivity, and over the decades capitalist entrepreneurs 
have seen a market in that and catered profitably to such needs for self-
construction. The combination of digital technology, telecommunications and 
software for social networking is the pinnacle of this development. ‘Self-activity’ 
as self-construction has shifted from labour to ‘material life’ (consumption). 
In a further twist, capitalist production tries to tap into that new resource 
(consumer co-production, subjectivity in the workplace, as mentioned before), 
but crucially, the curse of accumulation and inequality, and hence domination, 
persists. In the workplace, subjectivity is consumed by capital as a productive 
force. But in order to do so, and in order to valorize commodities beyond the 
catering for material needs or traditional luxury, that productive force which is 
subjectivity must be let loose without too much control in the sphere of 
consumption. 
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The great contribution of dialectical materialism was to recognize that if there is 
to be fundamental change it is not enough that there is a society that is unjust 
and exploitative, but also that this society has produced the possibility 
(‘productive force’) to go beyond itself, both in the sense of an organizational 
capacity to break up the existing order and as a capacity to organize the new 
society. Both are best captured in the formula of ‘general intellect’ as put forward 
by Marx (1993) in his Grundrisse. While Marx saw it incorporated in machinery as 
‘objective scientific capacity’, Virno (2004: 106) sees it, today, ‘presented in living 
labor’. 
The general intellect includes [...] formal and informal knowledge, imagination, 
ethical propensities, mindsets, and ‘linguistic games’. In contemporary labor 
processes, there are thoughts and discourses which function as productive 
‘machines,’ without having to adopt the form of a mechanical body or of an 
electronic valve. (Virno, 2004: 106) 
According to Virno, post-Fordist industry builds heavily on the imaginative and 
communicative ‘intellectuality of the masses’ (2004: 107). This intellectuality is 
crucial. One important ingredient in any revolution – and the reason why there 
have been so few of them in the past, and also the reason why most of them were 
led by intellectuals – is that it takes not only the ability to organize and lead (in 
the sense of military leadership), but crucially, it takes imagination. Virno does 
not explain where this increase in imaginative and communicative intellectuality 
emerges from – but whoever knows business organizations from the inside also 
knows that they are not the places where the imagination is fostered. It comes 
from the outside – it is a cultural import. And the culture nourishing it is that of 
consumption. Colin Campbell celebrates the consumer’s ability to gain pleasure 
through cognitive and emotional self-control: 
In order [...] to possess that degree of emotional self-determination which permits 
emotions to be employed to secure pleasure, it is necessary for individuals to attain 
that level of self-consciousness which permits the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ 
[Coleridge]; disbelief robs symbols of their automatic power, whilst the suspension 
of such an attitude restores it, but only to the extent to which one wishes that to be 
the case. Hence through the process of manipulating belief, and thus granting or 
denying symbols their power, an individual can successfully adjust the nature and 
intensity of his emotional experience; something which requires a skilful use of 
the faculty of imagination. (Campbell, 1987: 76) 
In the first instance this liberation of imaginative potential, this autonomous 
imaginative hedonism does the job of what Haug (1986) portrays as outcome of 
capitalist manipulation; it creates much-needed markets to soak up the output of 
a senselessly overproducing capitalist industry. But Haug and other followers of 
Vance-Packard-style theories of mind control overestimate the extent to which 
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advertisers and marketeers can contain the spirits they conjure up. Berman 
concludes: 
Where the desires and sensibilities of people in every class have become open-
ended and insatiable, attuned to permanent upheaval in every sphere of life, what 
can possibly keep them fixed and frozen in their bourgeois roles? The more 
furiously bourgeois society agitates its members to grow or die, the more likely 
they will outgrow it itself, the more furiously they will eventually turn on it as a 
drag on their growth, the more implacably they will fight it in the name of the new 
life it has forced them to seek. (Berman, 1999: 96-97.) 
Such a drive to individual development culminates in the consumerist imperative 
of ‘be all that you can be’, in which status competition is carried out through 
invidious comparisons of interesting, but meaningless, personality (Brown, 
1998). In the words of Zygmunt Bauman:  
In the carnivalesque game of identities, offline socializing is revealed for what it in 
fact is in the world of consumers: a rather cumbersome and not particularly 
enjoyable burden, tolerated and suffered because unavoidable, since recognition of 
the chosen identity needs to be achieved in long and possibly interminable effort – 
with all the risks of bluffs being called or imputed which face-to-face encounters 
necessarily entail. Cutting off that burdensome aspect of the recognition battles is, 
arguably, the most attractive asset of the internet masquerade and confidence 
game. The ‘community’ of internauts seeking substitute recognition does not 
require the chore of socializing and is thereby relatively free from risk, that 
notorious and widely feared bane of the offline battles for recognition. (Bauman, 
2007: 115) 
But we have seen such allegedly insulated ‘internauts’ engage in precisely what 
Bauman here suggests they are abandoning: struggles for recognition. Most 
prominently, of course, in the ‘Facebook revolutions’ throughout the Arab World 
(see e.g. Nigam, 2012), but also before those, Cooper and Dzara (2010) spoke of a 
Facebook revolution in LGTB activism in which constructions and assertions of 
individual identities are linked up into the construction of social problems. There 
is no reason why, given its inherent promises, affordances and moral 
contradictions, capitalism itself should not become problematized in such a way. 
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